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he large-scale sale of public assets by the Greek government is the latest straw to 
which policy-makers are desperately trying to clutch, as the Greek debt saga threatens 
to drag down the European economy. Privatisation, however, will prove to be nothing 
more than a mirage. 
Privatisation can help when the problem is one of liquidity. If the problem is one of solvency, 
privatisation will only make matters worse, especially if it has to be done at distressed prices 
(Masasse, 2011). 
The government of Greece has officially promised to raise €50 billion (close to 20% of GDP) 
by 2015 through the sale of public assets. More in the short term, privatisation receipts of €30 
billion constitute the cornerstone of the second Greek rescue package ECB that is currently in 
the process of being finalised. It is highly unlikely that even the sum of €30 billion will be 
realised in the coming three years, but the real question is whether privatisation is in 
principle a useful way to reduce public debt. The short answer is no. 
That privatisation cannot solve a solvency problems should be clear from first principles. By 
selling assets, the government can obtain funds to reduce its debt service burden, but it also 
loses future revenues. A priori the two should cancel out each other without a net gain or 
loss. But large-scale privatisation to reduce short-term debt (by paying maturing bonds in 
full) will actually increase the risk premium on longer-term debt. 
When the government sells assets that would otherwise be at the disposal of Greece’s 
creditors in case of default, the value of the remaining privately held (long-term) public debt 
must surely decline because in the absence of default the upside for creditors is limited (by 
the face value), whereas the downside will become worse in case of default. Privatisation 
thus devalues the value of the existing claims of long-term creditors. 
On top of this we have to consider at what price Greek assets could be sold when the country 
is on the brink of bankruptcy. At present the market already heavily discounts the value of 
an unconditional promise of the government to repay a certain nominal amount in euro. Any 
investor is thus likely to discount even more the implicit promise not to undertake any 
measure to reduce the value of the assets the Greek government has to sell under duress. The 
price at which assets can be sold will reflect at least the same discount as the price of existing 
government bonds, which now average close to 50% of the face value for longer-term bonds. 
Moreover, when a government has to default, it will be tempted to use regulatory and other 
measures to reclaim part of the returns from the assets it has previously sold. For example, it 
could lower regulated prices for utilities, port and airport fees, etc. This “time-inconsistency” 
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problem implies that it would make more sense to privatise once the debt overhang has been 
dealt with (preferably through a market-based restructuring (see Gros & Mayer, 2011). 
A helpful analogy is to think about Greece as a company that is technically insolvent (i.e. that 
cannot pay its bills on time without official help). If this company sells some of its assets to 
satisfy some privileged creditors who are closely linked to senior management, the other 
creditors, especially long-term bond holders, will surely be worse off. This is why bond 
covenants forbid this kind of operation. 
There is no free lunch when a country has a solvency problem. Asset sales only reshuffle 
claims among different creditor groups. Any attempt by the official sector to reduce its own 
risk must ultimately increase the risk to private lenders and thus make market access more 
difficult. The simple model in the annex shows this phenomenon formally. 
The economic intuition behind this result can also be seen by a comparison with official 
lending which is senior to existing private creditors. Privatisation establishes a sort of de facto 
seniority. 
Proponents of privatisation argue of course that privatisation will increase growth because 
private investors would put these assets to a more productive use. But most of the assets 
slated for the first round concern utilities and other natural monopolies. Transferring them 
into private hands might increase monopoly profits, but not growth. But even if this were 
not the case; if one could expect private monopolists to be much more productive and 
competitive, it is still the case that privatisation is highly unlikely to ignite growth on a 
significant scale. The existing capital stock in Greece (without land) is estimated to be worth 
around €600 billion. The full privatisation programme of €50 billion would thus not even 
affect 10% of the national capital stock. 
In the case of Argentina, it is interesting to note that very large-scale privatisation 
programmes were implemented in the context of various reform programmes even years 
prior to the onset of the acute crisis. However, they could not stave of default because the 
government had lost the revenues from the assets which had been sold previously. 
All in all, it is thus likely that the risk premium on longer-term Greek government bonds will 
actually increase as the government privatises its most liquid assets, which are also those 
that yield solid revenues during normal times. In the end, privatisation might make it 
actually even less likely that the Greek government will ever be able to return to the capital 
markets. 
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The following illustrative model makes the general point more explicit. 
The model has a country with a (foreign) debt equal to one. Assume the future of the country 
in question is not certain. With probability (1-π) the sun will shine and the country will be 
able to repay its creditors in full in the next period. For simplicity we can assume that in this 
good state of the world, the resources available to the government (and thus for creditors) 
are equal to (1+ρ), where ρ indicates the return on some government asset (stakes in state-
owned enterprises, ports, airports, etc…). However, with probability π the country will 
encounter a bad state of the world in which the sum available for creditors will be only μ 
(some maximum tax revenues determined by the political system) plus the returns from the 
assets of the government, ρ. 
If we consider the case of a country that privatises its assets because it has financing 
difficulties, we have to assume that μ+ρ <1, which is less than the full face amount of the 
debt. Clearly under the bad state of the world, the country defaults. 
The price (value) of the private long-term debt (as a proportion of its face value) will then be 
given by: 
 
Where (1-( +ρ))>0 represents the hair cut private creditors have to accept in case of default. 
Assume now that the government sells the assets which yield ρ. The proceeds from the 
official financing are used to reduce its short-term debt burden (i.e. fewer loans from its euro 
area partners). At what price can these assets be sold? We could argue that the returns from 
these assets are not directly affected by a default so that the expected return should not be 
discounted. However, this is not likely to be the case in reality since a default would 
certainly have a negative effect on the economy, thus reducing the returns from any real 
assets located in the country. Moreover, when a government has to default it will be tempted 
to use regulatory and other measures to reclaim part of the returns from the assets it has 
previously sold. For example, it could lower regulated prices for utilities, port and airport 
fees, etc... If the market discounts the value of an unconditional promise of the government 
to repay a certain nominal amount in euro it is likely to discount even more the implicit 
promise not to undertake any measure to reduce the value of the assets it has to sell under 
duress. This is why it is likely that the price at which the assets will be sold will reflect the 
same discount as the price of existing government bonds (given by PV in equation (1) above). 
Privatisation receipts will thus be equal to ρPV. 
This implies that once privatisation is completed (it takes place within the current period), 
the outstanding amount of debt will be given by: (1- ρPV). (As shown below, the main result 
would not be affected even if the assets could be sold without a discount.) 
After privatization, the amount available for foreign creditors of the country is only equal to 
µ if the bad state materialises. Keeping in mind that the (private) debt outstanding is reduced 
to (1-ρPV); this implies that the value of debt (as a proportion of its face value) is given by: 
 
The impact of privatisation on the risk premium can be calculated by comparing the price 
after privatisation to the price before (given by equation (1)). 
The difference between the two cases is given by:  
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This can be simplified: 
 
This expression is clearly positive (under the maintained hypothesis that in the bad state 
total government revenues are insufficient to fully service the initial debt burden). It is also 
apparent that the drop in the price of long-term bonds is proportional to the probability of 
default, π. If it is close to zero, privatisation has only a negligible impact. 
Notice that in equation (6) the sign would not change even if the assets could be sold without 
a discount (in the model: if the debt burden could be reduced by ρ, instead of ρPV). The 
underlying reason is quite simple. In the good state creditors will at any rate obtain at most 
the face value of their claims. Privatisation cannot thus increase the upside for creditors in 
the good state, but privatisation will lower the downside in case the bad state materialises. 
The general message from this little model is clear. A large privatisation programme (larger 
ρ relative to µ) will, ceteris paribus, increase the difference in the price, i.e. lower the price of 
existing long-term debt, or, equivalently increase the risk premium demanded by the private 
creditors. 